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PREFACE
This brief study is the result of the initiative taken in the spring of 1973
by the Saturn.V Program Office (Richard G. Smith, Manager) of Marshall Space
Flight Center, through its Program Control Office (Thomas S. Johnston, Chief).
The study is intended to satisfy numerous requests by individuals, private enter-
prise, and other Government agencies for a record of how the Saturn V Program
Office conducted its activities and how it succeeded in managing an enterprise
as large and complex as the Saturn V launch vehicle. The study was prepared
during the 1973 American Society for Engineering Education/National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration Summer Faculty Fellowship Program, con-
ducted at Marshall Space Flight Center under the joint direction of the University
of Alabama and Auburn University. The principal advisor for the study was
Mack W. Shettles, Branch Chief, Saturn V Program Office. For their patience
"and assistance in support of this project, the author wishes to thank those
individuals listed above, as well as Kenneth L. Rossman, Robert P. Shepard,
William H. Savage, Edna W. Hunter, Peggy Potter, Harriet Askew, and the
staff of the MSFC Historical Office, especially Mitchell R. Sharpe. The inter-
views mentioned in the Bibliographical Note and References do not do justice
to the additional time and effort contributed by many of these people. The
author also wishes to thank Dr. J. Edwin Rush, Director of Graduate Pro-
grams and Research at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, for office
facilities and access to the files of the Saturn History Project.
It should be noted that the opinions and judgements expressed in this
study are those of the author, and do not reflect official National Aeronautics
and Space Administration or Marshall Space Flight Center policy.
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THE SATURN MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
The activities of the Saturn V Program Office cannot be divorced from
the overall management philosophies of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). More-
over, the threads of continuity run backwards, past its organization in 1963, to
the prior operation of the Saturn Systems Office, the Army Ballistic Missile
Agency, and the work of the von Braun team during World War II. This histor-
ical summary and analysis is intended to place the evaluation of the Saturn V
Program Office in a relevant historical perspective, and to describe its role
in NASA's Apollo/Saturn Program.
BACKGROUND
In 1962, pausing to look back over a career in which he played a key role
as a leader in rocket research, Wernher von Braun noted two significant factors
of success. First, the group of .German rocket experts, known as the von Braun
team at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, had been what von Braun called
a "fluid, living organization," as it was shaped by external forces and, also, as
it responded to them. Secondly, von Braun noted the three decades of consistent
activity at the forefront of rocket development, an activity conducted with a
"singleness of purpose, " in advancing the infant art of rocketry. "We have had
only one long-range objective: The continuous evolution of space flight," he
emphasized. "Ever since the days of the young Raketenflugplatz Reinickendorf
in the outskirts of Berlin in 1930, we have been obsessed by a passionate desire
to make this dream come true."
As he looked ahead toward the goal of a manned lunar landing, von Braun
forecast the existence of a team numbering in the hundreds of thousands. This
did not necessarily imply a drastic change in the approach to attaining the goal.
There would be certain adjustments in style and techniques of management before
Neil Armstrong set foot on the moon in 1969, but the managerial style evolved
by the von Braun team over 30 years of experience persisted as a single thread
of continuity. As von Braun himself remarked in 1962, despite the changes over
the years in personnel, in geography, in nationality, and in bureaucracies,
"many of our methods have remained unchanged. Ml It is significant that many
of these methods remained current during the active life of the Apollo/Saturn
Program, and carried over into other phases of management in astronautics at
Marshall Space Flight Center.
In analyzing the success of the Saturn launch vehicle program, it is
essential to remember the years of experience brought with the program by
the von Braun team and to remember that a significant cluster of key personnel
remained together from the 1930's onward. The von Braun "team" began with
von Braun's assignment in the German Ordnance Department in 1932, where
he had the assistance of one mechanic to engage in rocket development work.
By the spring of 1937, when the group had grown to 80, the German Army sent
orders to shift rocket work to a new research and test site at Peenemuende;
located at the edge of the Baltic Sea. The most intensive work there occurred
between 1942 and 1945, when the Peenemuende work force numbered about
10, 000 and had constructed and launched approximately 3, 000 missiles of the
V-2 type. • . . •
The next cycle of activity brought the von Braun team to Fort Bliss,
Texas, where 120 key personnel labored for the U.S. Army from September
1945 to April 1950. The hegira to Fort Bliss began in southern Germany in
the closing weeks of World War II, when several dozen of the Peenemuende
engineers and their families sought to avoid the advancing Russian armies.
With sketchy information as to the location of the U.S. Army, the German
rocket group headed towards southern Germany. At the same time, under the
code name of ."Operation Paperclip," a cadre of U.S. military intelligence
personnel was scouring the countryside for high level German scientific and
technical experts — especially the group that had been responsible for the
awesome V-2 rockets. The two groups finally linked up when Wernher von
Braun's brother, Magnus, rode his bicycle down a country road in search of
a U.S. Army intelligence unit.
The transition to the arid climate of the American Southwest was not
easy. In the postwar era, research involving rocket weaponry languished,
and "space flight was a concept bordering on the ridiculous. " In more ways
than one the early Fort Bliss period was, as von Braun phrased it, the "years
of wandering in the wilderness" for the German rocket team. But work in
rocketry still persisted, based on several dozen V-2 rockets captured in
Germany and shipped back to Fort Bliss. The U.S. Army Ordnance Corps
added 400 military personnel and civilians to the operation, and the Germans
and their families became much more involved in American society and culture.
Then in April of 1950, the Army transferred its rocket development work to
facilities available at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. Six years
later, in 1956, an important reorganization took place in the Army's rocket
program. In order to get the short-range Redstone into operational status and,
into the field as rapidly as possible and in order to develop the Jupiter
intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Army formally established the Army
Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), which quickly grew from a nucleus of about
1, 600 to about 6, 000 personnel. Moreover, in the course of Redstone and
Jupiter development, the von Braun team began its first real work in develop-
ing rockets for missions into space.
Using modified versions of the Redstone and Jupiter, ABMA produced
the launch vehicles that placed the first American satellites in orbit around
the Earth, and next around the Sun. In addition, the ABMA establishment
received the first orders to develop a large launch vehicle, based on the
concept of clustered engines, that became known as the Saturn I. Crowded
with events that marked the inaugural American ventures into space, the
ABMA period lasted less than 5 years. With the creation of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958, the national'program for the
exploration of space was intended to be primarily a nonmilitary venture.
NASA authorized the Marshall Space Flight Center at Huntsville on July 1,
1960, and the heart of the new NASA facility was transferred directly out of
ABMA, comprising the von Braun group with over 4, 000 personnel and
$100, 000, 000 in equipment and rocket hardware. 2
As Director of the newly formed Marshall Space Flight Center, von
Braun faced some immediate managerial challenges. The core of the MSFC
staff had come from ABMA' s Development Operations Division, which he
had directed for the Army. But the Development Operations Division essentially
had been a research and development group depending on other ABMA offices
for ancillary support and administrative services (Fig. 1). After the transfer
to NASA, the new MSFC Director had to develop an administrative as well as
technical staff, in addition to correcting the lack of offices for procurement
contracting, facilities engineering, and other support services (Fig. 2). The
von Braun team not only found itself in a civilian organization for the first
time, but the style of operations had also changed, as there were now respon-
sibilities for numerous projects as opposed to the ABMA experience of dealing
with only one prime project at a time, phasing from one program to the next.3
Nevertheless, in spite of the increased scope of management respon-
sibilities under the MSFC organization, the management style there retained
a distinctive in-house capability — what von Braun liked to call the "dirty
hands" philosophy. The in-house capability, buttressed by the years of
active work as a research and development group in Germany and by the
arsenal concept of the ABMA days, provided an exceptionally strong number
of laboratories and shops at the Huntsville facility. Managers and engineers
were never very far away from each other, and the maintenance of the
relationship (and its elaboration) persisted as a key element in the success
of MSFC' s management of the Saturn Program.
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EARLY SATURN MANAGEMENT
Eberhard Rees, who succeeded von Braun as MSFC's Director in 1970,
said that when the Apollo/Saturn Program was inaugurated in the early sixties,
the adolescent NASA organization really had no comprehensive management
apparatus, and the management system developed "after some painful experi-
ences" during the early development period. The management organization for
the overall NASA program, as well as for MSFC, was not set up in a flash of
insight, to remain unchanged for the duration of the program. Rather, as the
program gained momentum and the configuration of the launch vehicles them-
selves began to evolve, management organization and tools began to evolve,
but they always changed as the programs changed over the years. As Rees
observed, one of the axioms in the evolution of a large development project
was that no static system of management would suffice.4
The management setup for the early period of the Saturn Program, when
the Saturn I was the only launch vehicle being developed, relied on the Saturn
Systems Office (SSO). At the heart of SSO were the three project offices:
Vehicle Project Manager; the S-I Stage Project Manager; and the S-IV/S-V
Stages Project Manager. The Vehicle Project Manager cooperated with the
stage managers in overall vehicle configuration and systems integration (the
S-V was a small third stage concept that was ultimately dropped from the
Saturn I configuration and should not be confused with the Apollo/Saturn V
launch vehicle). The Saturn I first stage was produced and manufactured in-
house by MSFC at Huntsville, and the production of the upper stages as well
as the engines and the Instrument Unit involved comprehensive, but no burden-
some, management of several other contractors. The SSO was a comparatively
small program office, even up to the spring of 1963 when it numbered only 154
personnel. Its operation was based primarily on the strength of other Center
administrative support offices and the work of what were known as .the "line
divisions." The latter were based on the nine technical divisions, or labora-
tories (numbering several hundred personnel each), carried over nearly intact
from the ABMA days.
The laboratories themselves carried significant prestige within the
Center's operation, and tended to benefit from very strong support from
von Braun. In fact, most of the technical and design decisions were reached
by consensus during the "board meetings" which included von Braun and the
lab chiefs in executive sessions. Since the lower stages of the Saturn I vehicles
were produced in-house, this proved to be a workable arrangement, and it
must be rembered that the lab chiefs had worked this way for years, first at
Peenemuende and later at ABMA. It was not until the launch of the fifth Saturn I
vehicle, SA-5, that a live upper stage was carried — the S-IV stage, manufac-
tured by the Douglas Aircraft Company (later McDonnell Douglas Corporation).5
The launch of SA-5 occurred January 29, 1964, several months after a major
MSFC and Saturn Program reorganization occurred designed to accommodate
the growing scale of contractor work, as opposed to the traditional in-house style
of rocket development by the von Braun team. .Much of the work in SSO concerned
funds and liaison with NASA Headquarters. This was conducted in a very informal
manner, with SSO personnel frequently visiting in Washington with Headquarters
personnel.8
The growth of the Saturn Program to include development of two new
launch vehicles resulted in a reappraisal of the production and management
organization. During 1962, the finalization of plans for a two-stage Saturn IB
(for earth-orbital manned Apollo hardware tests) and the three-stage Saturn V
(for the manned Apollo lunar landing missions) enlarged the scope of SSO and
prompted the shifting of MSFC into what was to become primarily a management
role. The change was underscored by von Braun in remarks to a management
convention in 1962 when he observed "our rocket team has become today more
than ever a managerial group." It was felt that the Saturn IB and Saturn V
manufacturing programs were far beyond the in-hoa.se capability of MSFC and
available Government resources, requiring large scale contracts under MSFC
management instead. However, the diversity of the major contractors and
subcontractors, scattered coast-to-coast, suggested a management challenge
beyond the logic of the existing apparatus (Fig. 3). Compounding the task of
developing and integrating two or three large, complex stages and an instrument
unit into a single vehicle that would mate with the spacecraft and launch facility,
were the multidiscipline problems of weight, size, and man-rating (Fig. 4).
The complexity was further increased by budgetary constraints and tight
schedules. "In solving this management problem, NASA and Marshall modified
existing and other agency management techniques, devised new ones, and then
changed them again as the situation demanded. "T
The reorganization of SSO in 1962 combined the similar Saturn I and IB
vehicles under the management of a single office, established the Saturn V
Launch Vehicle Office, and set up the Saturn/Apollo Systems Integration Office.
The technical divisions of MSFC did not change much under the new NASA
organization and continued to report directly to von Braun, although their
functions in support of MSFC programs were basically those of before. The
divisions were not aligned specifically to projects, but were organized along
professional disciplines such as electronics, mechanical engineering, flight
mechanics, and so on. Each division director had the responsibility to
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maintain a high level of expertise in his organization, keeping up with work in
industry and other Government agencies and carrying on theoretical research.
But, von Braun emphasized, "The technical people (must) keep their hands
dirty and actively work on in-house projects selected specifically for the pur-
pose of updating their knowledge and increasing their competence. " Through
such research and development work to stay abreast in the field, MSFC could
command the respect of the contractors' professionals and stay involved in all
phases of development, production, and shop work. This was the best way to
maintain evaluation of contractor standards and evaluate proposals, von Braun
emphasized. It was a matter of achieving the best economics in overall work,
and in getting the maximum for taxpayer dollars. 8
The same essential management style that persisted over the years
remained valid in 1962, von Braun said. In the approach to a new project for
development, the habit was to objectively assess a multitude of ideas and
complementary studies, with wide use of opinions from outside sources. Most
importantly, the Project Director exerted considerable influence, assuring
the crystallization of objectives, designs, and individual responsibilities. A
procedure for systems management was set up, and schedules for development
and test were set up, "which, from then on, is the holy gospel of the project."
In the normal course of events, substantive decisions contradictory to the
original base line of progress occurred only in unforeseen emergencies. If
the planning work had really been done well beforehand, he emphasized, no
real perturbations need arise. Should a serious hiatus occur, "there-is usually
something wrong with either the engineering concept or with the ratio between
the implementation plan and the resources committed to it. " The need for
flexibility was evident, because problems did occur, and it was necessary to
have an organization that was capable of making adjustments.9
These basic tenets were followed during other phases of the Saturn
Program and were most evident in the operations of the Saturn V Program
Office as it functioned from 1963 to 1969, following a major reorganization of
NASA Headquarters and the various Centers that occurred in the autumn of 1963.
REORGANIZATION OF 1963
As the momentum of the Apollo/Saturn Program increased and the
activities of NASA Headquarters proliferated in response to the manned lunar
landing program and other diverse NASA responsibilities, a major reorgani-
zation was planned to cope with all of the expanding operations (Figs. 5 and 6),
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The reorganization involved all of the major Centers taking part in the Apollo/
Saturn Program,10 and the change that occurred at Marshall Space Flight
Center set the style for its operations for the next 6 years, when development
of the Saturn V launch vehicle was the most concentrated. The change at
MSFC revealed a strong reflection of past organizational arrangements, but
also increased the authority of certain segments of the managerial structure
and established very successful new working arrangements between NASA
Headquarters and MSFC, and within MSFC's new organizational framework
(Fig. 7).
Effective September 1, 1963, the reorganization at MSFC established
the Center Director's Office (with appropriate staff and functional offices)
directing two new operational segments: the Research and Development
Operations (R&DO) and Industrial Operations (IO). Both of the new organi-
zations possessed equal operational authority, and both reported directly to
von Braun as Director of MSFC.11 Operations between the two, however,
were continuous, and certain elements on the IO side had a direct and contin-
uous relationship with NASA Headquarters.
In essence, the laboratories for R&DO were direct descendants of the
older technical divisions, while the basis for the IO elements were modifi-
cations of the former Saturn Systems Office. At the heart of the IO organi-
zation were the three program offices, established for the direct management
of the industrial contractors who had responsibility for the Saturn launch
vehicles: the Saturn I/IB Office, the Saturn V Office, and the Engines Office.
The latter was new, shifting responsibility for engine development and pro-
duction from the laboratories to the IO side of the organizational chart, in
keeping with the intent of the 1963 reorganization for better management control
by means of program and project management.12
Each of the program offices was set up similar to the parent IO organi-
zation, so that each Program Manager had a cluster of small, dual-purpose
staff and functional offices, in addition to the Project Offices for technical
management. There was some combining of closely structural elements.
The Saturn V Program Office, for example, managed the S-IVB stage, used
on both the Saturn IB and Saturn V. Similarly, with certain of the engines
used in more than one stage or vehicle, direction of the engine program was
more effectively guided from one responsible Engine Program Office.
13
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Arthur Rudolph, head of the Saturn V Program Office, emphasized
that the managers of the staff and functional offices were not simply "staff"
but equal to the Project Managers for each of the project offices tinder
Rudolph's jurisdiction.13 The staff and functional offices had multiple roles,
insofar as they supported not only the Program Manager but each of the
Project Management offices and interfaced with NASA Headquarters as well.
They were known informally in NASA circles as the "GEM Boxes" after
George E. Mueller, who headed the Office of Manned Space Flight.
Formal guidance and direction from Headquarters to the Centers came
down through the Associate Administrator's Office, to the Center Director,
and to the Program Manager, but daily informal management was accomplished
through the GEM Boxes, which provided a "mirror image" between Head-
quarters and the Centers (Figs. 8 and 9)14. The GEM Boxes in the Centers
were identical to those in Mueller's office in Washington, D. C., and facilitated
a daily, and free, flow of information in both directions. "Since like persons
were talking at both ends," commented one long time observer of the system,
"confusion and misunderstanding with accompanying loss of time and funds
were held to a minimum." The impetus for this aspect of the managerial
apparatus primarily came from Mueller himself. During visits to MSFC,
Mueller emphasized to von Braun that the labs (R& DO) were really going to
have to adopt more of a support role in terms of the new program management
structure, and that better communications with Headquarters through IO were
urgently required. Mueller felt that the Centers in general were too independent
in their Headquarters relationships and that the lack of communications, on a
regular basis, was a serious shortcoming, "So I put together this concept of
a program office structure, geographically dispersed, but tied with a set of
functional staff elements that had intra-communications between program
offices that were below Center level and below the program office level so
as to get some depth of communications. "15
THE SATURN V PROGRAM CONTROL SYSTEM
Following the 1963 reorganization, the new program offices began to
formulate their mode of operations. As head of the Saturn V Programs Office,
Arthur Rudolph called on considerable managerial expertise in project
management of rocket vehicles dating back to the years at Peenemuende, and
especially during the ABMA period when he served as Project Director for
the Army's Redstone and Pershing programs. During 1961 through 1963,
15
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Figure 8. NASA Headquarters/MSFC relationships.
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he had also worked at NASA Headquarters, in the Systems Engineering division
of the Office of Manned Space Flight. From that perspective, he had watched
the plans for the Saturn V evolve, and was already cognizant of such factors as
schedules, funds, and performance requirements.16 He also had specific ideas
of how his program was going to run, and placed considerable emphasis on what
he called Program Element Plans (PEP). Rudolph's staff often chafed under
the requirements to write up these rather specific PEP documents, which detailed
what each office was going to do and how it was going to be accomplished. But
most of the skeptics finally came around. The PEP's really forced people to
think about the goals and mechanics of their respective operations and how they
interacted with other-offices. Even if they seldom referred back to the docu-
ments, they proceeded with greater success, having been forced to think through
the procedures from the start, eliminating potential roadblocks and pitfalls.
"I think the major problem is that in big programs like the Saturn V you have
many people involved and usually people want to go off on tangents, " Rudolph
explained. "And the biggest problem is really to get them all to sing from the
same sheet of music, to put it in the simple fashion. That's the biggest
problem. "17 James T. Murphy, who acted as Rudolph's Deputy Manager,
Management, summarized the role of his chief: "In its simplest concept, a
program manager, with a supporting staff, has been designated to coordinate
the efforts of all Government and private industry groups in developing and
producing the Saturn V Launch Vehicle. "18
A major instrument in establishing a managerial approach to this end
was the Saturn V Program Control System Plan, originated by Rudolph's office,
in 1965, as Directive No. 9. The plan's objective was to establish a method
to set up a "baseline definition, " against which progress could be plotted,
problems highlighted, corrective actions taken, and management kept informed.
Directive No. 9 instructed personnel in the Saturn V Program Office to augment
the management approach in five major areas:
1. Baseline Definition
2. Performance Measurement and Analysis
3. Problem Resolutions
4. Management Reporting System
5. Program Control Center
The baseline definition was primarily geared to matters of cost, schedules,
and performance, achieved through program elements suchras logistics,
finance, testing, and so on. The program elements comprising the baseline
definition were under the control of the staff/functional offices known as the
GEM Boxes.
18
Brief Description of Five Mueller Boxes
Program Control Office: Primarily responsible for costs and budgets,
progress report, and logistics including manpower and facility require-
ments, scheduling and contracts, and configuration management.
Systems Engineering Office: Responsible for mission description, over-
all systems specifications, and systems description.
Test Office: Charged with test planning, performance, coordination
and standards, and for the establishment of checkout requirements and
coordination.
Reliability and Quality Office: Responsible for establishing and main-
taining reliability and quality standards, including contractual require-
ments, compilation of statistics, and failure reports.
Flight Operations Office: Charged with assuring that all flight hardware
was ready for manned flight operations, including the establishment of
necessary requirements, plans, and coordination.
Each of the staff/functional offices was required to set up a Program Element
Plan to achieve the following:
Program Element
1. Management Plan
2. Schedule Control System Plan
3. Procurement/Contracts Plan
4. Documentation Plan
5. Configuration Management Plan
6. Equipment Management Plan
7. Logistics Support Plan
8. Facilities Plan
9. Manning Requirements
10. Finance Plan
11. Technical Requirements and Definitions
12. Reliability and Quality Assurance Plan
13. Testing (Master Test Plan)
14. Launch and Mission Operations Plan
15. Data Interchange Plan
16. Growth Potential Proposal
19
Each office involved in the Program Element Plan was further instructed
to formulate a Program Directive to implement its respective tasks, and to
establish authorities and responsibilities. All of this information was submitted
through the Program Control Office for approval by the Program Manager.
Once the program element requirements and objectives were established,
each.office with program element responsibilities was expected to maintain the
monitoring and assessment of .its activities, in terms of "Performance Measure-
ment and Analysis. " In the case of difficulties in the program, the "Problem
Resolution System" (developed by the Program Control Office) was to be
implemented. .Having identified the problem and assessed its impact, the
requirement was to follow through by assigning appropriate personnel and
resources, determine a solution, and close out the problem (Fig. 10). The
Program Control Office also was responsible for the adequacy of the "Manage-
ment Reporting System. " This applied to recurring as well as unscheduled
reports to management personnel, and the dissemination of program data
within the procedures for the respective Program Element Plans. Finally,
there had to be a focal point for the display of baseline data, in order to
measure performance against it. Again, the Program Control Office was to
cooperate in setting up display requirements for each office with a program
element responsibility, and to operate and maintain the "Program Control
Center" as this focal point.19
Obviously, the Saturn V Program Control System was only one aspect
of a workable managerial approach, which included a number of groups and
systems in support of the concept of Program Management at MSFC. Additional
facets of the managerial mix included Inter-Center Coordination, Working
Groups, and Management Matrices, as well as a number of other managerial
tools (like PERT and SARP), other offices (such as those on the on-site
resident managers), and other managerial tools.
INTERFACES AND INTER-CENTER COORDINATION
There was a myriad of interfaces to be controlled throughout the Saturn
Program, such as those between stages, between the payload and the vehicle,
and between the vehicle and the launch facilities. With contractors and three
major NASA centers in the Apollo/Saturn Program, the interface problems
covered physical, functional, and procedural areas, which often became
intertwined. The documentation included both drawings and written directives
20
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to establish basic responsibilities as well as the limits of responsibilities for
the parties involved. Once established, the documentation became fixed and
could not be altered unless all parties involved came to agreement on terms.
It was important to establish the interface aspects at the beginning of
the Saturn V Program, with collaboration of appropriate Inter-Center Coor-
dination Panels, working groups within MSFC, contractor advice, and a strong
input from the R&DO labs at MSFC.20 Thus, if a contractor originated an
Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) against the current configuration, hie
knew in advance the interface impact, since the interface documents were .
already drawn up, noting the potential downstream impact of the upstream
change in question. The contractor had the opportunity to coordinate possible
changes ahead of time, by notifying related personnel of the time of the change
and its ramifications.
Inevitably, difficulties often cropped up during the process of interfacing
various stages of the launch vehicle, spacecraft, the various hardware facilities,
and related equipment and systems. So it was that, in order to maintain con-
figuration control, a group of Inter-Center Coordination Panels was established
to resolve the interface problems. Technical personnel were appointed from
the centers and from other NASA agencies as well. The formal communications
media between panel members involved the Interface Control Documents,
divided into two levels: Level A documented technical interfaces between the
centers and Level B did the same for end items supplied by the NASA con-
tractors. If the change concerned a single stage and involved no other inter-
faces, then the proposal could go through a change board at the Project level
at MSFC. If the change affected the interface with another "end item," it had
to go to the program level (Level B). If the change affected the program of a
different NASA center, it was necessary to go through the Inter-Center Coor-
dination Panel to reach a decision (Level A). In situations where the Inter-
Center Coordination Panel could not reach a decision, an executive group, the
Panel Review Board (PRB), supervised and adjudicated the issues as necessary.
The PRB was chaired by the Apollo Program Director at NASA Headquarters,
and channeled its decisions back through the appropriate centers arid program
offices.21
Even after a decision to proceed on an engineering change was reached,
it was necessary to relay all the appropriate change information to all areas
that might be affected and make sure that the new guidelines were followed.
In order to make sure that the configuration of the launch vehicle remained
consistent, it was important to utilize effective configuration control. Richard
G. Smith, one of Rudolph's successors as the Saturn V Program Manager,
22
remarked that "configuration management in some form is necessary in order
to control technical changes and weigh them against cost and schedule impact. "
As a technique used in aerospace research and development (R&D) for several
years, it reached its zenith in the 375-series manuals issued by the Air Force.
NASA used a simplified version that was very effective, with control boards at
each level of management. Their distinctive asset was that they operated so
as to delegate the developmental effort in a very effective way at the lowest level
possible, and made certain that every aspect of R& D activities and engineering
design changes were properly monitored and evaluated from the standpoint of
technical, schedule, and financial impact.22
Management at MSFC regarded configuration management under five
basic functions. First, the idea was to make sure that the contractors adhered
to the requisite procedures and disciplines in drawing room operations. Second,
during manufacture, it was necessary to assure that design intentions were
carried through. Third, there should be approval for mandatory changes only.
Fourth, there was the need to know exactly the configuration delivered to the
launch site, down to the most minute detail. Fifth, there had to be "trace-
ability"—the capacity to trace failures in the hardware and materials down to
the point of origin. Over a period of years, the management team at MSFC
learned to approach these goals with some degree of caution. It could be very
expensive, and caution had to be taken not to "overdo" in setting up the guide-
lines, so as to apply the goals wisely in regards to prime contractors and their
subcontractors. Management had to constantly ask if too little or too much was
being done; it had to keep close watch on the costs; it had to ask if the information
coming out was really worthwhile and if it was being used. ® The principles of
configuration control were praised by Eberhard Rees, who remarked that they
were "extremely fruitful judged against the enormous expense of the program
and the dire consequences of failure. " But he added a note of warning in terms
of their application to other endeavors, "At a corresponding level of execution
with more limited funds, it could have been prohibitively expensive. n24
Within MSFC itself, there were a number of "working groups, " that
originated early in the Saturn Program to cope with various development
problems that had cropped up, and they became the acknowledged organizations
to work on the various interface problems concerning Huntsville's work on
Saturn. The working groups were originally created in 1960 by Oswald Lange,
who at that time headed the Saturn Systems Office. As he explained it, "The
Working Groups have been formed to make available the experience of MSFC
and contractor representatives toward the solution of stage interface and
system problems." The idea was not to de-emphasize the responsibilities of
other MSFC organizations or those of the contractor, but to provide a mode of
23
fast reaction for monitoring special areas and making informed, incisive
recommendations through appropriate channels. The number of such, working
groups varied from time to time, with each group chaired by a senior technical
authority from one of the laboratories, and a membership including represen-
tatives from the appropriate Program Offices. Their recommendations were
channeled through the Program Office Configuration Control Boards.
The paperwork generated by all of these elements—Headquarters,
Centers, contractors, and subcontractors—began to reach unmanageable
proportions. The Saturn V Program Office attempted to keep the volume down,
and to establish a level of priority for key documents. In other words, which
instructions took precedence over others? It took several weeks to set up
guidelines and levels of authority, but still the problem remained as to clarify-
ing the new hierarchy of documentation. In an elegant solution, the Program
Control Office prepared a master chart for the Program Control Center on
which each of the key documents was displayed with appropriate lines of
authority. With the master chart complete, notebook sized copies were avail-
able for distribution and reference (Figs. 11 and 12).25
MEETINGS AND REVIEWS
In order to gauge the status of the program and to assess its progress,
hundreds of MSFC personnel engaged in various levels of daily, weekly, and
monthly staff meetings. Although informal contact between Saturn V Program
Office personnel and contractor personnel occurred on a day-to-day basis, in
addition to recurring visits to contractor plants, the formal get-together was
the format known as the Contractor Quarterly Project Review, which was
begun in late 1964. In these meetings, top contractor and MSFC managers
reviewed not only the technical status of the project, but also the management
status of the project. In the meantime, the Saturn V Program Manager's
Office customarily held various staff meetings with each of the Project
Managers in Huntsville and also conducted a more elaborate monthly Saturn V
Program Review with all of the Project Offices involved. These sessions,
begun early in 1965, kept the Program Manager fully informed on a periodic
basis and provided an additional forum to cope with interrelated problems.
Moreover, it helped to generate information for the top-level Management
Council meetings for the Office of Manned Space Flight, convened by the
Associate Administrator at NASA Headquarters each month, or as required.
For these meetings, the Program Managers and other designated personnel
24
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accompanied the Center Director and participated in analyzing problems and
progress, while at the same time receiving Headquarters information on policy
changes and various program directives. As a frequent participant on these
occasions, Eberhard Rees summed up the usual format as follows26:
1. Where did the money go and can we manage within the allotted
funds remaining?
2. What preplanned tasks have been accomplished and can we meet
the projected schedule?
3. What are our major technical and programmatic problems and
what previously unforeseen actions must be taken to overcome
them?
4. What are our major motivational problems?
In addition, two other top-level meetings were customary in the Saturn
Program, one within NASA management and one including the contractors.
Once a year, OMSF conducted an annual Apollo/Saturn program review attended
by the NASA Administrator, James Webb, and selected staff. The Center
directors attended, and formal presentations were made by designated senior
executives from within the Centers. These annual reviews gave the Adminis-
trator a comprehensive and critical analysis of contractor and program per-
formance over the past year, with projections for the year ahead. Also, on
occasion as required, George Mueller convened what he called the Apollo
Executive Group. This group involved the chief executives of the contractors
in the Apollo/Saturn Program. They met at various major contractor sites
for briefings on what everybody else was doing, and visited each of the major
NASA Centers. Mueller said that without the Apollo Executive Group, "we
would not have been able to succeed -- i t was one of the things that made it
possible to suceed." All of the chief executives became more aware of the
problems and possibilities, and felt more a part of the program. And it gave
NASA and the Centers "top level interest and support."27
The Saturn Program used a technical review system to assure that devel-
opment, design, fabrication, and test activities for each stage were properly
evaluated. These reviews, such as Critical Design Reviews and Flight Readiness
Reviews, were attended by senior technical experts and top management as
appropriate (Fig. 13).
27
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RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CONTRACTOR
Aside from the various communications, visits to the contractor facil-
ities, and quarterly reviews with the contractors, the Saturn V Program Office
had immediate representation on the site in the form of the Resident Manager's
Office (RMO). At each location, the on-site RMO operated as a "mirror image"
of the respective Project Manager back in Huntsville. The RMO was directly
responsible to him, and communicated with him on a day-by-day basis. The
head of each RMO had a small staff of technical and contractual personnel from
MSFC and, as the primary interface between MSFC and the contractor, exer-
cised a reasonable amount of onsite authority when called for.28
Eberhard Rees admitted that the surveillance of contractor operations,
as well as their management, was "somehwat sensitive from the point of view
of the contractor. " In many instances, contractors felt that they should be
allowed to go their own ways, once the contract was signed. But Rees com-
mented that this concept of loose reins on the contractor had not always worked
out too well, from the MSFC point of view. "Consequently, " he advised, "it
became clear that close and continuous surveillance of the contractor operation
was required on an almost day-to-day basis. " The extent of the surveillance
was proportional to the subtleties and problems of the program, its relative
position in relation to existing state-of-the-art, and the extent of expertise
possessed by the particular Government agency involved. Reaction to this
aspect of Government monitoring was not favorable at first, but eventually this
"penetration and monitoring" crystallized into the oft repeated phrase, the
"Government-industry team. " The concept of contractor penetration was an
important one, involving the contractor's relationship with his own subcon-
tractors, and eventually became a very successful concept, involving all per-
sonnel in the program. The key to this aspect, Rees said, was the implemen-
tation of the RMO concept in the plants run by the contractors.
Since the role of the RMO was to expedite decisions, he had specialized
assistance in contract administration and technical engineering, supplied from
the Center's parent organizations. This small cadre of specialists was "to
assure that project management interests were advanced and that decisions
were made and implemented within the designated scope of authority of the
resident group. " With the backing of his staff, guidelines supplied to the RMO
allowed him to make certain on the spot decisions, including the authority to
commit parent offices and/or functions of the Center. "This resident element
proved to be a most important link between government and contractor activities
29
in the management of large programs. " In Bees' opinion, the process of
project management was definitely accelerated as a result of this on-site
authority, providing a "dynamic interface" between MSFC and the contractor.
As he described the functions of the RMO29:
"Essentially contrived to focus specialized management
attention on a day-to-day basis, it also provided a mech-
anism for tempering the varying emphasis on government
project and functional groups and in the contractor organi-
zation. For example, the technical functions tend to
strive primarily toward perfection to a degree possible
inhibiting adequate attention to manufacturing and launch
schedules or cost. The contractor could well be oriented
toward schedule, costs and profits whereas the project
manager might weigh his concern more heavily on schedule
and costs. Through the offices of the resident manager,
an automatic system of checks and balances developed to
the end that each consideration received its appropriate
share of attention. " (See Figure 14.)
One of the most interesting aspects of MSFC and contractor relations
was the concept of "contractor penetration, " as exemplified by the RMO
approach. In terms of affecting even managerial organization of the con-
tractors, NASA could exert considerable influence in influencing technical
decisions. General Samuel C. Phillips, who directed the Apollo Program
Office at NASA Headquarters, revealed this influence during one of the Pro-
gram Review sessions, held at NASA Headquarters in 1964. He noted that
various contractors had strengthened their organizations during the preceding
year, "either on their own or due to appropriate influence by NASA. "30
Phillips' comment on the use of "appropriate influences" was some-
thing of an understatement since MSFC could, and did, exert a considerable
amount of muscle in literally forcing contractors to change their mode of
operations. In 1963, the development of the S-IVB stage reflected this
initiative on the part of MSFC management. An interesting aspect of the S-IVB
was its dual role, as the second stage of the Saturn IB vehicle and as the third
stage of the Saturn V. This duality posed something of a problem of interfacing
for the S-IVB prime contractor — the Douglas Aircraft Company. As discus-
sant for the S-IVB project during the 1964 program review, Lee James pointed
out that MSFC management wanted to make sure that Douglas did "not see two
faces at Marshall. It is important they see only one. " So, as far as the
contractor was concerned, the Saturn IB/S-IVB Manager acted as deputy to the
Saturn V/S-IVB Stage Manager, placing basic responsibility in the Saturn V
Program Office.31
30
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During the course of his presentation, Lee James spoke on the subject
of "Saturn I/IB Launch Vehicles and Related Facilities," in which he noted
that management constituted a "major part of the problem. " Moreover, he
continued, "a major part of that problem was considered to be with Douglas.'"
Douglas had never really set up a project oriented organization, James
explained, and the management structure in operation never worked very well
in any case. The crux of the difficulty seemed to be Douglas' facility at
Sacramento, known as the Sacramento Test Facility (SACTO), set up as a part
of the engineering division and the manufacturing divisions, with ties to both
Santa Monica and Huntington Beach. As a result, James said that there was
no place "to pull their organization together" to make sure programs like the
Battleship Test and the All Systems Test evolved smoothly and logically.
Management at MSFC stepped in to make sure that management at Douglas met
the MSFC concept for a successful operation. Lee James put it bluntly: "We
forced Douglas to reorganize Sacramento into a separate entity." As a result
SACTO reported directly into the higher echelons of Douglas management,
and MSFC was also involved in the reassignment of Douglas' Deputy Director
of the Saturn Program as the new Director of Sacramento Test Operations, a
further benefit to the reorganization. In order for MSFC to operate from a
stronger posture at Douglas, it was decided to strengthen the office of the
Resident Manager and bring a new man to do the job. James said that over 90
applications for the position had been received, and he was pleased to report
that "a very strong individual" had been chosen. In fact, the successful
applicant was so eager to shoulder the responsibilities that he took a cut in
salary amounting to $ 8, 500. "I think we have found just the man we are
looking for in order to give us the strength on the spot that we need," James
concluded.32
The policy of contractor penetration did not imply relentless meddling
in the internal affairs or organization of the company. Indeed, most of the
pressure applied by MSFC seemed to occur early in the program. While
monitoring obviously continued, it was conducted on a somewhat lesser scale.
The problems in the beginning were peculiar to the complicated requirements
of simply getting "cranked up" in terms of early R& D inputs into a new pro-
gram like S-IVB Battleship Testing, where MSFC, Douglas, and Rocketdyne
(the engine contractor) were all involved. As one approach, MSFC formulated
a "start team" using personnel from all three organizations. This special
group operated so as to coordinate and channel early activities, and proved to
be a very successful approach in the S-IVB Program. As the program reached
momentum, the contractor assumed more responsibility on its own. "We also
recognized in the S-IVB Program that Douglas is a major manufacturing
32
organization and once they get rolling, they are a good organization, " said James
emphatically, "Our problem always is on the initial stages. We have made a
major effort to concentrate getting the first stage out the door, knowing we can
trust a contractor like Douglas to follow on with the succeeding stages. "33
Getting the contractor's initial stage out the door, however, did not
always signify smooth sailing ahead. The S-II second stage of the Saturn V,
manufactured by North American, became a severe problem for the Apollo/
Saturn Program in the mid-sixties. A dramatic indication of the S-II difficulties
occurred on September 29, 1965, when the S-II-S/D (st rue tares/dynamic test
stage) ruptured and fell apart during a loading test at North American's plant
in Seal Beach, California.34 This meant a serious delay in testing, and MSFC's
dynamic test program at Huntsville was'recycled to use the S-II-T (static test
firing stage) after it had completed test firing at NASA's Mississippi Test
Facility (MTF). Reviewing the problems during the annual program review at
Headquarters, General O'Connor noted managerial and technical shortcomings
at North American and said that MSFC had "caused changes to be made in
management; some people have been moved." In spite of help from the R&DO
labs at MSFC, there were continuing problems in welding, inspection, insulation,
and component qualification, and the first S-II flight stage was more than 3
months behind schedule. "It is my opinion that program management at North
American is perhaps the principal shortcoming of the entire S-II program, "
O'Connor said.35
During the spring of 1966, the S-II-T stage ran through several success-
ful static firing tests at MTF before disaster struck again. This time, the
stage ruptured and exploded during a pressure test on May 27, injuring several
technicians.36 The test program once more had to be readjusted, with loss of
time and money, and the first flight stage, S-II-1, was sent to MTF for careful
static test firing. MSFC personnel found numerous faults in the stage, as well
as other stages. The second flight stage, S-II-2, had gone through manufactur-
ing, but had to be sent back for numerous modifications and fixes. MSFC
organized special "Tiger Teams" and dispatched them to Seal Beach for man-
ufacturing aid and to MTF to assist in the static firing operations. Summing
up the trials and tribulations of the S-II stages, General Phillips remarked,
"the performance of the contractor has not measured up to the minimum require-
ments of this program. »37
The problem of the S-II presented some difficult management challenges
for the Saturn V Program Office. Arthur Rudolph concluded that the program
had been badly starved for funds and began massive infusions of dollars into the
S-II project for overtime, increased manpower, moreR&D, and whatever was
33
necessary. Many observers at MSFC commented that the S-II had so many
difficulties because it was pushing the state-of-the-art in terms of size, mate-
rials, welding, and insulation for such a large stage using liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen as propellants. The S-II also got caught in the web of problems
related to the Apollo payload, which had gotten heavier, and the weight-saving
change orders on the S-II created difficulties in fabrication and manufacturing.38
Management at MSFC had foreseen some of the problems, but they proved to be
more complex than anticipated. There was also disagreement within Rudolph's
Program Office, with the Project Manager claiming adequate progress before
the troubles began to snowball, and the Program Control Office claiming that
there were danger signs already evident.39 Once the S-II got into deep trouble,
reaction was swift and visible, especially in the form of the "Tiger Teams" at
manufacturing and test sites. The program finally got back on track, with
Government and contractor cooperation, and the S-II performed splendidly in
every launch of the Saturn V vehicle, except for a problem on S-II-2 involving
an ASI line and engine cross-wiring. Even this flight was beneficial, however,
in that it demonstrated the S-II could meet mission requirements with two
engines out.
It was obvious that the technique of "contractor penetration" in order to
maintain high visibility generated some very thorny issues in Government/
contractor relations. But MSFC nevertheless continued to feel that industry
had a strong inclination to take control of the job and attendant funding, and
pursue the job with a minimum of Government intervention. In the opinion of
MSFC management, this allowed too much opportunity for slippage and problems
of other sorts. On the other hand, vigorous contractor penetration reduced
these program difficulties, and, in the long run, the contractors seemed inclined
to accept the penetration as a mutually useful aspect of completing a successful
program. "The restiveness that stemmed from such close control was gradually
dissipated very early in the Apollo Program as the benefits accruing from the
industry-Government team approach was revealed, " concluded Eberhard Rees.40
TYPES OF CONTRACTS
Realizing the relationship between contractor motivation and success,
the Saturn V Program Office implemented general NASA policy regarding con-
tract incentives as a means of encouraging the contractor to perform at the
highest possible level of endeavor. The original contracts were mainly the
cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) type which were useful in the early phases of the
34
Apollo Program when management had to deal with a program containing many
unknown factors, and close pricing was too uncertain. After the R& D phase was
well in hand and the unknowns were worked out, it became possible to adapt
incentive or award fee provisions in all Saturn contracts except the S-II stage
contract. The S-II contract eventually had limited award fee provisions for
management performance. The contracts for the Lunar Roving Vehicle and the
Instrument Unit were cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) from their initiation. The
remaining contracts were changed from cost plus fixed fee to cost plus incentive
fee in the 1966 time frame.
The CPIF contracts were established in two portions. First, there was
a comparatively modest base fee, and secondly there was a segment of pay-
ments scaled to incentives. These scaled incentive fees were awarded in
proportion to the contractor's success in meeting time schedules, cost allow-
ances, and performance ranges. The incentive fee type of contract was judged
to be most successful in cases involving hardware contracts where schedules,
costs, and major milestone were fairly well established. The Saturn V Pro-
gram Office considered the CPIF approach a very successful alternative to
CPFF contracts, since they encouraged the contractor to meet commitments
on hardware delivery and contributed to mission success.41
RELIABILITY AND QUALITY CONTROL
Within the Saturn V Program Office, as in other MSFC operations,
management paid special attention to the areas of reliability and quality control.
Viewing reliability as a significant element of basic design technique, the pro-
ject offices continued relevant techniques for judging the design of subsystems,
components, and parts, as well as the overall stage design. This approach
included techniques to evaluate the necessity for redundancy, criticality of
numbers, and failure mode and effects analysis. Management also pursued an
exceedingly active qualification test program, exposing components and sub-
systems to simulated flight loads under environmental conditions. This was
a major contributive factor to the success of the Apollo/Saturn Program, but it
was also expensive. The hardware itself was quite costly, and the rigorous test-
ing of such a large portion of it meant that a lot of the hardware could not be
released for duty as flight hardware. In some cases where funds were particu-
larly tight, qualification tests were conducted at a reduced level, followed by
intensive and exhaustive data analyses to extrapolate performance figures
35
through various regimes. The object here was to be able to use these hardware
units on actual missions later on. In such instances, it was necessary to exer-
cise special care not to overstress these future flight components, and to be
very careful in extrapolating data so as to avoid risks during the actual missions.42
The problem of quality control was further affected by reliance on the
Department of Defense, who exercised quality control management in some of
the contractor plants. In the mid-sixties, MSFC made an effort to increase its
own quality control programs, particularly in the inspection of incoming vendor
products as supplied to the prime contractors. Over a period of time, the
prime contractors themselves increased their vendor surveillance as part of
the quality control objective. Douglas, for example, evolved its own Approved
Parts List, and parts not listed were unacceptable in design specifications sub-
mitted by prospective vendors. Basic guidelines for the list came from MSFC
documents, buttressed by information from the military, industry sources,
Douglas' own experience, and substantiated by operational and test data in the
course of the program. Candidates for the Approved Parts List included such
things as bearings, fasteners, switches, relays, transformers, wire and cables,
capacitors, resistors, semiconductors, and fluid fittings. Among the tangle of
parts required to make a rocket work, the pipes and tubing with their respective
connections were expected to operate under extreme adversities of cryogenic
shocks, low density gasses, and added variables of wide fluctuation of temper-
atures and high intensities of vibration. It all had to be flight-weight and it all
had to have the impramatur of the Approved Parts List.43
In the meantime, the Saturn V Program Office continued to monitor the
activities of its own prime contractors, stepping in when necessary to advise
changes that were deemed necessary. One such instance occurred in July 1964,
when one of the weldments of the S-IVB stage failed and the consequent rupture
of the tankage caused the loss of the entire Structural Test Stage. As a result
of this incident, MSFC "caused Douglas to go into TIG welding with the higher
heat input than the MIG welding that they were using in certain areas." Follow-
ing the change, MSFC technical personnel reported better reliability quotients,
and approved Douglas' revision of weld inspection procedures, which MSFC
judged to have been somewhat weak.44
In the area of reliability and quality control, the project managers found
that they had to exercise considerable diplomatic tact, assuring that the con-
tractor had sufficient leeway to develop valid concepts without overdoing the
design. "It is in the nature of experts that they become beguiled by intriguing
technological problems," warned Eberhard Rees, and such beguilement could
36
lead to the pursuit of reliability and performance parameters to excess. Such
an approach was sometimes tolerable in industry, in the interest of better
products for competition, but not in the space program. In the latter instance,
it was necessary to be constantly on guard against losing simplicity — some-
thing that was easy to do in the early stages of a program that was complex,
large, and pressed by tight schedules. "Even when weighed in the balance
against sacrifice of performance, design simplicity should be strongly favored,'
Rees recommended. Reduced to the simplest paradigm, more components and
higher performance parameters often increased the prospects for failure.
Summarizing the problem, Rees noted that "Project Management has here a
rather complicated task of putting the brakes on these tendencies without dis-
couraging development of new technology and with it of highly inventive people. "
Rudolph himself was adamant about this point, and put it even more succinctly:
"Make it simple, make it simple, make it simple!"45
In the quest for high performance, reliability, and quality control,
incentivized contracts constituted only one of a number of motivational
approaches. Several other techniques were employed by MSFC, including
cash awards and special recognition for quality control, cost reduction, and
other activities. At MSFC, the Saturn V Program Office cooperated with the
Manned Flight Awareness Office in a program to inform and remind all workers
in the Apollo/Saturn Program about the criticality of the activity and the need
for individual effort for success. By means of awards and recognition pro-
grams, the Manned Flight Awareness concept became an effective incentive
technique. The prime contractors also conducted special incentive programs,
in collaboration with'the Project Managers and RMO personnel. North
American's program was known as PRIDE (Personal Responsibility in Daily
Effor t ) , and Douglas had its "V. I. P. " campaign (Value in Performance).
With MSFC's Manned Flight Awareness personnel, the contractors also par-
ticipated in a program to make sure that vendors and subcontractors shipped
critical spare hardware in special containers and boxes. These were marked
with stickers and placards imprinted with reminders to handle with particular
care, since they were important to the success of costly hardware and the
astronauts whose lives depended on the integrity of the hardware.46
THE PROGRAM CONTROL CENTER
As a focus for decision-making, the Saturn V Program Office relied
on a special facility known as the Program Control Center. The nature of the
Saturn Program, with contractors and NASA facilities scattered coast to coast
37
presented a special management challenge as to the means of codifying all the
information in order to make the correct managerial decisions. As explained
by one of the Saturn V Program Office managers, it was "essential that we had
some way of making sure that we had pulled together all the facets of the pro-
gram into an integrated program with good visibility. And that, I would say,
has been probably the main purpose of this Program Control Center — to try
to provide the Program Manager with that integrated visibility. "4?
The archetype of the Program Control Center was probably the "Manage-
ment Center", developed in 1956 for the use of Rear Admiral William F. Raborn,
Jr., during the Polaris program. In the process of getting ideas for Raborn's
Management Center room, his personnel visited the Air Force Ballistic Missile
Division in Inglewood, California, and, interestingly, the ABMA operation in
Huntsville. The Polaris Center was finally designed to avoid the look of a board-
room and was filled with 90 chairs facing a large glass motion picture/slide
screen in the front, with numerous charts hung on the walls around the room.
The idea was to provide maximum visual capability of Polaris events, and to
serve as a briefing room.48 As a management tool emphasizing visibility, The
Boeing Company elaborated this concept during its Minuteman Missile Program
for the Air Force. Beginning in 1959, a series of Boeing control rooms resulted
in a style of'visual presentations, by means of charts and audio-visual aids,
intended to reduce the reams of management reports being used to monitor the
progress of the program. The company activated such a control room at its
S-IC (the Saturn V first stage) manufacturing facility at Michoud, near New
Orleans, Louisiana, in 1964. In 1965, Boeing was awarded a contract by MSFC
to develop an advanced control room management facility at Huntsville.49 This
became the Program Control Center (PCC) of Rudolph's Saturn V Program
Office. Although the Marshall Center's PCC had something of the look of a
boardroom about it, it became a highly utilized and active facility. The con-
ference table in the center of the room seated up to 14 key principals, and the
movable chairs around the edges of the room raised its capability to several
dozen (Figs. 15 through 17).
In one way, the PCC epitomized the managerial concepts of "manage-
ment by exception" and "single threading. " The technique of management by
exception was based on the premise that the Program Manager should keep his
span of contracts within manageable limits, and Arthur Rudolph relied heavily
on his Project Managers to carry the workload, vis-a-vis the contractors and
various problems as they arose. "Within my Saturn V Program Office, "
Rudolph explained, "each Project Manager has wide latitude to exercise manage-
ment actions just as long as these actions meet established technical performance
requirements and schedule and budget constraints. " Rudolph's control of the
38
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Figure 16. Saturn Program Control Center layout.
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Project Managers went just far enough to assure that performance, schedule,
and budget guidelines were met, that interfaces were kept in repair, and that
redundancy was eliminated. "This policy of management by exception has
enabled us to operate effectively and efficiently and has given my people the
incentive to perform to their fullest capabilities," he said.50
Within the framework, however, it was necessary to develop a means of
singling out special problems for more detailed analysis, including probable
program impact, and to know exactly who was responsible for monitoring and
solving the problem. The concept of "single threading" provided graphic doc-
umentation, by way of charts, for tracing a problem down to a detailed position
for assessment and probable course of action to resolve it (Fig. 18).51 The
means for such analysis was embodied in the data organized for viewing in the
PCC. As such, the PCC was an arena for comprehensive displays for use by
management — a focal point for collection and presentation of information con-
cerning the status of the Saturn V Program, and planned so as to provide displays
for various levels of detail, permitting managers to identify the problem, begin
action for resolution, and monitor the progress.
In reality, the PCC for the Saturn V Program Office was one of a network
of such rooms, located in the Apollo Program Director's Office at Headquarters,
at each of the three Apollo/Saturn NASA Centers (Kennedy, Marshall, and
Houston), and each of the prime contractors, as well as MTF. Together, they
allowed top management and other personnel to keep up with a myriad of activities,
including logistics, astronaut training, scientific projects, selection of lunar
landing sites, the world-wide tracking network, mission planning, and the mis-
sion itself. Each had the latest information and up-to-date displays for its
appropriate job, including general Apollo/Saturn Program information as
required, along with a sophisticated communications system to accelerate the
decision-making process.52
The PCC provided two basic ways to display information: open wall
displays and projected visual aids. The open wall displays were used to portray
information that was updated and changed on a cyclical, day-to-day, or new
problem basis. Most of the display charts were constructed so that they could
be moved in and out of position on special horizontal tracks. They were marked
by coded symbols so that the viewer could tell at a glance if a project was lagging,
ahead of schedule, or currently on schedule. Both the Project Offices and the
staff/functional offices submitted appropriate data and maintained liaison with
PCC personnel throughout preparation and use of the display charts, and were
responsible for having proper attendance in meetings where their display
material was to be discussed (Figs. 19 and 20).
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An important aspect was that each display carried the name of the
individual responsible for the data on view. If the Project Office representative
could not answer questions, or supply additional information, the person to
contact was immediately identifiable from the chart, and a quick phone call
could get him -- or the information -- during the meeting. For example, some
charts concerned items being covered by what MSFC called the Problem Resol-
ution System. The data on view indicated the criticality of the problem, the
specific hardware or operation involved, the originator of the data, the "Action
Manager" coping with it, and its current status. Other charts showed aspects
of costs, technical data (weight, performance, configuration management),
and so on.
But always, Rudolph insisted on having a name associated with the charts.
He wanted to work with a person, he said, not just an anonymous office. Back-
ing up the charts was a comprehensive set of "management matrices" in note-
books, listing all individual counterparts, by name, for all major systems and
subsystems of the hardware, in addition to all of the functional people. The
matrix pages included MSFC counterparts for IO and R&DO, other Centers,
and the contractors as well. To find out why a valve didn't work, the Saturn V
Program Office could call each person responsible, and not waste time calling
the wrong office or waiting for an office manager to decide who was competent
to respond to a specific query.53 Rudolph wanted a fast and accurate response
to problems, and he usually got it (Fig. 21).
For a long time, the rear of the PCC was dominated by a huge PERT
chart (Performance, Evaluation, and Reporting Technique). PERT was a
sophisticated and complex computerized system, with inputs beginning, literally,
at the tool bench. Technicians on the floors of contractor plants around the
country monitored the progress of nearly all of the hardware items and trans-
lated the work into computer cards and tapes. Data for costs and schedules
were also entered into the system. If a gas generator exhaust line under test
in California was showing problems, how would this affect the static test
schedule at MTF, and a scheduled launch from Cape Kennedy? What will be
its cost impact ? How will it affect other hardware ? What do we do about it ?
Broken down into 800 major entries, summarizing 90,000 key events taking
place around the country, PERT helped provide the answers (Fig. 22).5 / l
The concept of the PERT network, like the PCC, received a strong-
impetus in the Polaris program in the mid-fifties.55 During the early phases
of the Saturn Program, MSFC management regarded PERT as a very success-
ful effort. During a NASA Management Advisory Committee conference in 1H64,
von Braun said that PERT was the best source of information available on the
46
sin1
>-
in
CD
H)
^ •'"'
1. 2
' '•
3
•3
D
<J
U
0.
u
0
<
K
to
<
H
•
4V
1R
O
N
M
C
N
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
U
U
u
z
<
o
B
j
o
oc
V-
z
0
u
t
3
3
u,
z
p
S
T
R
U
M
F
N
T
/
Z
_)
<
U
2
u
uj
u
z
0
a.
G
X.
n
H
K
3
H
U
a
H
U
H
P
H
U
 w
C £
— O
u
• ^
*l
3?
. I
D 1
•
e
Z
_ ; •
1?
. 2
• j 2.
,
• «
II
2
a, 1,
|«
•» r-|s
5
(c i
. ^•i <
2
C i.
ij
|5
. 2
I
'.
• .
3: 3
-
L/
'
u
^ s
11
; <
2 ^
^
u
2 Xii
• <
2 u
»
2
>
C
_*• 2C
*- <
1 *
>
ffi
- a.
« ,_
& ?
± „
C <
& £
1 V
I ^
; <
2 _
_ -s.
? X
E z
Q
£
_•
X
j
? —
_> =
* ?
./i i-
u0
c
u.
O(-.
U
u.
u o
7 a
-1 3.
1
1
3. C
Lf ~
^ C
t
Z
u i
r
6
2 -
r- C
5
E c
" *
*«
• ?
^ .£
g
t
5
u
c
>
C jj.
^ <
2
... a.
>
a
k t"
• <
> *?
»i
t|
A
>
^
1?
3
tf 0.
e
>
5
i" P
^ 5
C '
. 2
-j a.
n
>
- i
" <
i3 ^
. 2
-i CL.
K.
>
- a
4 ^
1?
. 2
0. Q.
e.
>
V.
si
k H
• <
* «
•a
* 0.
E
\
; ^
* 2
t
12
j
<
3
«*
=
i .
3u
U o
i
1
1
c
'
B
^
1
05
>
1
.
ll
•* ~ <
f. ••
>**
f^ '
M1*'
-: u
z
i x
•£ z
o f-
r <
^ u
«;
t
z
• „
C '
; i
• u
E <
^ i
>
m
• >-
5
^
A
K
• H
! <
~ u
; rf
I
7 ix
3 z
f <
J w
zH
U
,^
c
|
_
g
u
I"
0
c
a:
- Z
t.
i ^u. ~^ .
oC
-^ Z
~
z
^
c Q
k ^'
X
-^ Z
4
ig
. K
U. Z
7
e a
. a.
u. z
«
o C
M
^ Z
C^
• a.
f Z
|
•|
L
C
>
5-
^
5 H
Jl
J fL
>
M
-A
AT
-S
U/
S
> B.
|
>
3
^ h-
t?1
• 2it &
B
>
» ?
a?
.2
c
E
a
IV
S
-M
d
•
*
•
•
"
«
*!
 
•(
A
>
v W
I?
& ^
. a
a. a
>
^ H
;?
5
•c a.
E
5
£. H
£•*
a.
i
Oliii
2 si! I-
s . a ^ =
= : 8i SI
- J ri
r o J*
• . -1
= U *i
z ;
h
% 1
5-! I
I* Ml
i ' 33
- !
iii
' ' $
0 1 t1
 i zj
.
I 0.1
• ; o' •
:s is1 i
u < £ < l Ei
• u .u 1 . c
"3 •'-•I 3 J
"" 1
1
1
» 1i i -e; i i
:S i «
J < 1 -0
°u 1 *J
6 S i < i
t
i
S, I i
.( \ i
S2 ! *1
. i i,
oS [ <I
1
I
3 ! -1 1 U
* £ 1 •« f- • j
*• ^ i * <0
 u • c
.; i » i
«« ii
ii i
f ' :
!« *«zi ! "g
a v, I o- i
^71
11
•t ii" '
II 1 u
? i i
l
hi
O
C
u
O
H
U
U
n -.
> O
«-, —
7
« '
* ir
a?
. z
e D
• —
* <
5*
-> a.
3
« <
2 •?
I
3
• /
1$
;|H Q.
^
•*- "T
k H
s;d, .
- Z
z a.
3
• H
^ <ff. *?
. Z
x c.
i
c
Z
* <
" 2
- c.
*
> _
1 ^
5
8
^ a
Is
"u
u.2
u
23li
IN
4
fiE •
V «
£ H
1*
w
 U
a3
c ^I"
* K1!
a S
S >|«|S
1 "
» u
c '
IB
t c
£• H
r w
E <
« w
o «
V
Z
U1j S
1
2
|
« _
• *
u *
W. f-
H
U
C
u
o
H
u
•
=> Q
T at
•fl Q.
j!
• k
<S J
k ^
I
!i
i' j
^ n
»
^2• 4
>-i
!i
i
"9
Jz
^ (Q
;
2
k
==3
d S
2
JJE
I
o
Rj
O
'a
rt
og
o
cC
oj
CM
CD
cC
47
CS
<-*
"3
H
w
a
Xi
a
-LJ
CQ
IN
CM
a
bC
48
status of hardware programs. At the same time, the PERT network did not
catch everything: a parts problem on Boeing's S-IC-T (test stage) had been
missed. Still, MSFC managers in 1973 recalled PERT as one of the most
useful management systems, even though the PERT network was phased out
about the time of the launch of the first Saturn V vehicle (AS-501) in the winter
of 1967. For one thing, it was tremendously expensive. Making the network
perform adequately demanded a large number of people within NASA and from
the contractor's special computer programs. "It has some use as a pre-
liminary planning tool, " said R. G. Smith, a Rudolph successor, "but when
tens of thousands of events per stage are used, it is difficult to analyze,
usually lagging in real time usefulness, and subject to manipulation to avoid
exposure of real problems. "5G
The paraphernalia to serve PCC display requirements included slide
projectors, viewgraphs, and motion-picutre projectors. The PCC used a
pair of rear-projection glass screens at the head of the room, where a
speaker's lectern was located. The lectern was equipped with an array of
switches so that whoever was making a presentation could dim the lights,
activate a remotely controlled slide projector, turn on the movie projector,
or signal for a change of viewgraphs. The lectern also contained controls
for tape recording if desired. All of this audio-visual equipment was housed
in a permanent work area behind the glass screens. The wall charts were also
backlighted, so that they would stand out for use while the lights were dimmed
during audio-visual presentations. The size and complexity of the charts
required a separate workroom nearby. This workroom contained all of the
necessary materials for preparing the wall displays, including photographic
and other reproduction equipment. Since the wall charts were constantly
changing, reflecting the evaluation of the Saturn Program, PCC personnel
shot a photo of each chart before it was updated or dismantled to make way
for a new display and kept the photos in a special historical records file.
The reproductions of these wall charts played an important role in
MSFC's inputs into Schedule and Review Procedure (SARP) reporting. SARP
was a Headquarters requirement, "as the official method of documenting
manned space flight program status as a basis for review and evaluation of
total program effort." A compilation was submitted monthly to Headquarters,
although a selected SARP compilation was prepared every Monday morning for
reference use by key personnel in the Saturn V Program Office and other
appropriate levels of Center management. In any case, the SARP reports
represented the latest official status of the Saturn V Program as visible in
the Program Control Center, and provided a very useful reference tool and
visibility in reports to Headquarters.
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The actual preparation of the SARP pages required some special attention.
When new and updated charts were completed in the chartroom work area,
personnel used a special Xerox copy camera to shoot a picture of the chart. The
Xerox camera was set at a calculated focal point so that the information deline-
ated on the 8 by 5 foot wall charts was precisely "shot down" to the 8. 5 by 11
inch sheets used for the SARP reports. This required some experimentation
on the original charts, choosing lettering that would still be legible in its reduced
scale and choosing chart colors that would show up on the Xerox copy. This
system, while appearing to be disarmingly simple, was the result of considerable
trial and error and was judged to be highly successful. Reproducing the charts
from standard photos was unwieldy and time consuming, as well as lacking in
clarity. Redrawing all the charts on such a frequent basis was out of the
question. The carefully planned and scaled Xerox camera copies afforded legible
reference charts, literally within minutes (Fig. 23).
During launch operations and special activities, the PCC was linked to
KSC and Houston by means of closed circuit television. Although conferences
in the PCC were not televised by closed circuit (because of space limitations
and technical problems), the communications arrangement permitted discussions
in the PCC to be heard at NASA Headquarters and other Centers instantaneously.
The ceiling of the PCC room was studded with extra-sensitive microphones, so
that anyone at the conference table in Huntsville could interject a comment or
respond without leaving his seat or waiting until a speaker somewhere else had
finished. When a main speaker in Huntsville was making a presentation, an
audience in Houston or Cape Kennedy could freely respond. In addition, con-
ferees visually followed the presentation at other locations by means of view-
graphs supplied beforehand by the speaker. The viewgraphs were transmitted
by Long Distance Xerox (LDX) system on a leased telephone circuit. Using a
standard 8. 5 by 11 inch size, the LDX line transmitted high-fidelity copies at
the rate of about two copies per minute. After receipt at the other end, per-
sonnel used them to reproduce the numbered viewgraphs, shown in sequence
as requested by the speaker. The fast response of the LDX system permitted
up-to-the-minute documentation, and, if there was not time to prepare new
viewgraphs, conferees at the other locations could be supplied with regular
Xerox copies instead. The ability to exhange such material, whether viewgraphs,
working drawings, or other documentation (such as SARP charts), meant that
informed decision-making could be accomplished while the meeting was in pro-
gress. It was one of Rudolph's techniques that the viewgraphs themselves
were rather extensive, in terms of words as well as diagrams, so that they
could serve as minutes of these PCC conferences.57
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
James Webb, NASA Administrator from 1961-1968, warned that in large
scale endeavors, such as the Apollo/Saturn program, managers needed to be
especially flexible, since many "unpredictable difficulties" as well as many
"unanticipated opportunities" would crop up. Many traditional management
concepts, perforce, were not applicable, since the large scale endeavor simply
was not a static situation. It was necessary for managers to have a sound foun-
dation in basic management principles, but be able to work in an environment
where the lines of communication crisscrossed, moved in unusual directions,
and where the job did not always have an exact definition in the beginning. In
the environment of the large-scale endeavor, the successful manager had to do
more than understand the organizational framework backward and forward. He
had to grasp the total dimensions of the effort and relate to his place in all of
the elements comprising the task.58 In this context, the style of successful
aerospace managers was to avail themselves of existing fundamentals of manage-
ment, whatever their source of origin, and raise them to a higher degree of
refinement in complex aerospace activities involving high technology.59 One
sophisticated observer characterized NASA's managerial contributions as
follows60:
"To accomplish the moon landing within the time set by
President Kennedy, Apollo's designers deliberately hewed
to techniques that did not reach far beyond the state of the
art in the early Sixties. The really significant fallout from
the strains, traumas, and endless experimentation of
Project Apollo has been of a sociological rather than a
technological nature: techniques for directing the massed
endeavors of scores of thousands of minds in a close-knit,
mutually enhancive combination of government, university,
and private industry.
Apollo has spawned an intimate and potentially significant
new sociology involving government and industry, an
approach that appears to stand somewhere between the
old arsenal concept favored by the Army and Navy and the
newer Air Force concept that depends heavily upon private
corporations to manage, develop, and build big systems.
The NASA approach combines certain advantages of each,
while enhancing the total abilities of both private and
government organizations. "
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In terms of the Saturn Program, successful management was a blend
of the decades of experience of the original von Braun team in Germany,
management concepts from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Government, and
private industry. As the Saturn Program evolved at MSFC, the Army's arsenal
concept was inherent in the R& DO arrangement, although its premier role was
altered as a result of the 1963 reorganization. As the early SSO began to
elaborate its relationships with prime contractors, Air Force concepts of con-
figuration management became more conspicuous. Both the Army and the Air
Force contributed key managerial personnel. Numerous Army officer exec-
utives left ABMA to join MSFC, including Lee James, who served at one time
as the Saturn I/IB Program Manager, worked at NASA Headquarters, and later
was head of the IO division. James replaced General O'Connor, who had
returned to the Air Force. From NASA Headquarters, the concept of Mueller's
GEM Boxes was a significant managerial technique in the Apollo/Saturn pro-
gram, and MSFC elaborated its own concepts of working groups, management
matrices, and the Program Control Center.61
From his vantage point as an active manager in the Army and NASA,
and observer of Air Force management, Lee James paid special tribute to
the R&DO labs, which gave MSFC "unusual depth." The labs were one of the
outstanding aspects of MSFC management under von Braun. "It's hard to
make them work in the government, " James said. "That is a unique attribute. "62
Although von Braun emphasized the overriding authority of the program and
project offices in their relationships with the labs,63 their contact was not
always unruffled. During a session with Headquarters executives in 1964, both
Rees and von Braun agreed, "The project manager is definitely in the driver's
seat on project management matters. R& DO provides technical knowledge in
depth to solve the technical problems, but at the same time carefully avoiding
any interference with contract management. The stage manager is the sole
contact with the contractor." Reading the minutes of the meeting a few days
later, one of the top level managers in the Saturn V Program Office expressed
his frustrations in an astringent comment scribbled in the margin: "Wouldn't
it be good if this were so! Top mgt. needs to say so in a policy statement and
then enforce it. "64 The situation festered for several months, until von Braun
issued a detailed directive to the heads of both IO and R& DO, in which the
authority of IO (and the Saturn V Program Office) was asserted in very
explicit terms.65
Although it is difficult to document, the relationships between IO and
R&DO were often uneasy. As recalled by an observer from within the Saturn V
Program Office, one form of managerial assertion was out-and-out harass-
ment. A stage manager might call up a lab chief in R& DO and complain about
the lack of activity or cooperation from the counterpart personnel in the labs.
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Other methods included pointed reminders about directives from the Program
Manager's Office, a claim to be acting at the behest of the Program Manager,
the use of technical knowledge that others would hesitate to contradict, and
outright exposure of deficiencies.66
The same techniques were also applied within the Saturn V Program
Office, as the staff/functional managers (the GEM Boxes) jousted with the
Stage Managers. It must be remembered that Rudolph considered his functional
managers to have as much authority as his stage managers. This, incidentally,
was unique to the Saturn V Program Office — other program offices tended to
allow the hardware managers greater authority. But Rudolph's arrangement
was deemed necessary in order to maintain a sort of vertical control over the
stage elements of the Saturn V, especially since the stage managers were
sometimes considered to manifest something of a parochial attitude in regards
to their own activities.67 The role of the functional managers was spelled out
in a PEP document68:
"Establishment of managers for functional areas is an important
management concept used in the Saturn V Program. These
functional areas, e.g. Program Control, Systems Engineering,
Test, may be considered as "vertical slices" of the vehicle
which result in stages, or "hardware" items. The functional
managers are responsible for planning, coordinating and
directing their areas, insuring that a single thread of effort
is carried from the highest level of Apollo management in
Washington through the Center level and into the prime
contractors."
The Saturn management concept consistently put a premium on visibility,
epitomized by the Program Control Center in the Saturn V Program Office.
James Webb, who prided himself in the development and exercise of managerial
expertise, was amazed by its conceptual format and versatility. During a visit
to MSFC in 1965, not long after the activation of the PCC, Webb was given a
thorough briefing on the facility by Rudolph and Bill Sneed, who was head of
the Program Control Office at the time. Following the briefing, Webb addressed
a select group of MSFC personnel, and was still obviously kindled with
enthusiasm for the PCC concept. "I saw here in the hour before you arrived, "
he exclaimed to his audience, "one of the most sophisticated forms of organized
human effort that I have ever seen anywhere. "69 It was a special compliment
to Huntsville's PCC that it became the model for NASA's Apollo Program Office
in Washington, as well as for other Centers and prime contractors. Over a
period of years, at Webb's behest, a stream of V. I. P. 's and key executives
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from government and industry trouped through the PCC. The guests included
George Schultze, director of the Bureau of the Budget; top military brass from
the Pentagon, Great Britain's RAF, and other foreign nations; privileged
managerial executives of the United States and abroad; and European space
agencies like ELDO and ESRO. The Saturn V Program Office also received
inquiries by telephone and letter from a wide spectrum of sources, including
the famed design group of Raymond Loewy and Associates. At one time, a
former member of the Polaris management team went into the PCC and came
away thoroughly impressed. "This chart room of yours is an amazing place,"
he said to Rudolph. "I used to think the ones we had in the Polaris program
were good, but this puts us to shame."70
In response to new directions in NASA programs and MSFC's role, the
Marshall Center's organization experienced several adjustments after 1969.
By 1972, the IO segments operated as individual program offices, reporting
directly to the head of the Center. The R&DO labs were set up as the Direc-
torate of Science and Engineering, along with several other Directorate organi-
zations. Under the new scheme, the Saturn Program Office contained all of the
various stage and engine offices for the Saturn IB and Saturn V, along with the
PCC. Many of the individuals associated with the original Saturn V Program
Office took new positions involving Skylab, the Space Shuttle, and other projects,
shaping their experience and skills towards the achievement of new goals in
management ( Fig. 24).
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